Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer!

 That iconic American, Mark Twain, said it best:  “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.”

It shows in the comments from Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday, justifying his country’s military takeover of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula:

“He … insisted that if Russian-speaking citizens in the east of

 Ukraine ask for Russia's help, Russia has the right ‘to take all

 measures to protect the rights of those people.’”[i]

And from Adolf Hitler as his forces entered Austria – without a shot fired – in what’s termed the “Anschluss” (or union) in March 1938:

            “The Reich will not permit Germans to be persecuted any longer

             in this territory because of their membership of our nation or

their loyalty to certain views … I have, therefore, decided to place

the assistance of the Reich at the disposal of the millions of Germans

in Austria … soldiers of the German armed forces have been

marching across the entire border of German Austria … They

will guarantee that the Austrian people will shortly be given the

opportunity to decide their future and their destiny by means

of a genuine plebiscite.”[ii]

Before long, posters were going up, declaring, “Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer!  (One people, one empire, one leader!)

Soon after, Hitler broke up Czechoslovakia, by taking over the Sudetenland, where ethnic Germans lived, and, later that same year, with the acquiescence of Great Britain and France, ended the country’s existence (at least until the war ended).

So here we are, facing the greatest fascist since Hitler, figuring out how to prevent Putin from issuing the next order, which will likely send his troops into combat in the Crimea and on a march toward Kiev.

There’s speculation, by one CNN military analyst, President Obama told Putin he wouldn’t commit American soldiers to resolve this problem.[iii] 

So what’s Putin doing?  Biding his time before making a move that will shock the world even more. 

The tragedy of this situation is that it parallels Germany and the 1930s, a time when a forceful response from Great Britain and France, maybe even the United States, to Hitler’s provocations could likely have averted an even greater calamity, a European war that, all totaled up, killed about 40 million people, maybe more.[iv]

Just like today, no western European nation then had the stomach for military action, even a limited amount, which could stop something worse.

Sure, it’s hard to find a reason Americans and its western European counterparts will fight in the Crimea or in Ukraine but it’s better to initiate a standoff now, when the situation is more favorable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

In fact, if Putin isn’t forced to withdraw, you can be certain, just as we learned from Hitler, he’ll strike again.  He was emboldened after Obama failed to involve the United States in Syria.  You have to fear what Putin will do next if Obama does nothing now.

Coincidence?

The Anschluss happened nearly 20 years after the end of World War I, a time when many people viewed Germany as a defeated warrior.  It was just over 20 years ago today that Soviet leaders learned they lost the Cold War. 

Right now, many look upon Russia and see what their grandparents and great grandparents saw in Germany up until September 1939 – a country that was.

Putin knows this and, like his long ago predecessor, the czar Peter the Great, he’s reestablishing his country’s former dominance. 

In addition, if this latest provocation shows anything, it’s this:  There’s no such thing as a “peace dividend,” when defense budgets can be cut.  With the end of the Cold War, the world’s more dangerous.

What’s next? 

That’s the question that needs to be answered.  The possibilities are endless but Putin could do any of the following:

• ·      Move against the Baltics.
• ·      Team up with China (one of the few countries supporting Putin’s actions) – it could send one submarine to make sure the United States and its Asian allies are prevented from keeping the South China Sea open to international fishing.
• ·      Align with China to prevent Japan from asserting its sovereignty over the Senkaku islands.  Here again, Russia could send a submarine to make a statement.
• ·      Russia occupies the rest of its former Soviet state, Georgia, also located along the Black Sea.

What can be done?

What’s surprising is that not even The Wall Street Journal’s editorial page editors saw this one.  They suggested deploying the U.S. Sixth Fleet into the Black Sea, long the dominion of the Russian (and, previously, Soviet) navy. 

An even better idea comes from the playbook of the one president Obama likely admires, Jack Kennedy.

On August 13, 1961, East Germans sealed off the crossing points between East and West Berlin and started building the Berlin Wall.  There was a very good chance they would move into West Berlin, kicking out the United States and its allies from the city. 

Instead of playing a weak hand, President Kennedy and his generals played a strong one.

They created the Berlin Brigade and seven days later, on the 20^th, marched 1,500 U.S. troops into West Berlin.[v]  Tensions were high but East Germany and the Soviet Union received the message – the United States would not be thrown out of West Berlin without a fight.

The same play could be used in Ukraine, perhaps in the Crimea, too.  Put U.S. troops, and allied ones on the ground and on patrol, saying very publicly they’re going to make sure the rights of those supporting the Kiev government are protected.

This puts Putin on notice.  If he fires a shot at an American or allied solider, there will be a vigorous military response.  Otherwise, we’re there as a peaceful force.

Journalist Gordon Brook-Shepherd, in his book about the Anschluss, states that Austria was always the world’s rehearsal ground.  Today, it’s in the Crimea and Ukraine.

If the United States and its allies fail to stand up to Putin, where does the stage go next?  How much worse will it be?

These critical questions require answers from President Obama and his foreign policy experts.

---

[i] CNN.com -- http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/04/world/europe/ukraine-russia-tensions/index.html?hpt=hp_t1

[ii] Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss, (New York:  J. B. Lippincott Company, 1963), page 188.

[iii] CNN.com -- http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1403/03/cnr.05.html

[iv] http://www.hitler.org/ww2-deaths.html and http://www.scrapbookpages.com/Austria/Anschluss01.html

[v] http://www.armyheritage.org/education-and-programs/educational-resources/education-materials-index/50-information/soldier-stories/303-berlinbrigade

The Rhymes of History

Sitting down in his study, the President of the United States reviews the war briefing he’s just received from his top military, political and foreign policy advisors and writes a few notes:

“This is what I know:

• We’re fighting a suicidal enemy.
• The enemy is militarily beaten but belligerent.
• There’s no sign of surrender.
• The enemy appears to be breaking up, with some saying they want peace while others want to fight. The ones wanting peace don’t speak with authority.
• The American populace is war weary.
• Problematic Allies.”

Sound like George W. Bush dealing with the war in Iraq?

Try Harry S. Truman, around June or July 1945, figuring out how to end the war with Japan so World War II could come to a conclusion.

President Truman likely never wrote those words, or anything similar, after talking with his advisors about the way to end the war with Japan, but he probably had thoughts along those lines. In the summer of 1945, as U.S. troops were occupying Germany, and the fighting on Okinawa against Japanese forces was ending, Truman was feeling pressure to end the war, on U.S. terms, as fast as possible.

Prior to Truman becoming president, senior U.S. military officers were focusing on the best way to bring the war with Japan to an end. Invasion plans were prepared for the Japanese islands and commanders and military units, as well as personnel, were selected for the pending assault, which was scheduled for November 1945. The goal was for Japan to surrender unconditionally, just like Germany did, 12 months after the Nazis gave up.

While plans were being finalized, top U.S. military officers, including the president, learned that a new weapon, the atomic bomb, would be at their disposal sometime that summer. There were a number of questions and issues about the bomb. Would it work? Was it a strategic or tactical weapon? Would it shock the enemy into surrender? Or would Japanese leaders react to it the way they did the night U.S. planes fire-bombed Tokyo, killing nearly 85,000 people? They didn’t.

These questions, the positions of top U.S. leaders, the debates between them, potential casualties resulting from the assault on Japan, as well as the complex issues the United States faced abroad and at home, are discussed with great authority by John Ray Skates, a history professor at the University of Southern Mississippi, in his book The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb.

The book is especially pertinent today as the United States debates the best way to end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while extracting some sort of political-military victory from the effort that’s been expended. It forces the reader to think about how the United States can shock its enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan into ending the fight; the book also makes the reader consider that perhaps there is no possible way to stun Al Qaida and Iraqi insurgents into submission. Skates, a retired army colonel, lays out, in excruciating detail, the debates, positions and discussions had by America’s leaders on the quickest and best possible way to coerce Japan into accepting the Allied policy of unconditional surrender.

In mid-1945, Japan still had five million men under arms. They’d lost every battle they’d fought against the United States since June 1942; however, Japan’s leaders didn’t see themselves as defeated. They knew U.S. troops would likely land on Kyushu, the Japanese island that American troops would invade in Operation Olympic, and they were preparing an intricate defense. While they couldn’t stop the invasion, Japan’s top brass thought, instead, that they could bleed the United States into accepting a negotiated settlement that was far short of its clearly stated, very public, and Allied-approved objective of unconditional surrender.

Skates shows how the policy of unconditional surrender for both Germany and Japan, as pushed through by President Roosevelt in early 1943, as well as the level of casualties the United States had sustained, determined military actions and, eventually, the use of the atomic bomb. The policy, as well as the experience from fighting Japan, forced America’s top leaders into coming up with the most efficient way into forcing Japan’s surrender.

By the time the summer of 1945 rolled around, the United States had suffered nearly 400,000 combat deaths with another 600,000 troops wounded. Top military commanders worried about the additional casualties the United States would suffer should it invade Kyushu. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, the Navy’s top officer, thought Japan could be brought down through a blockade that would essentially starve Japan’s populace – at minimal cost of U.S. lives; others, like General of the Army George C. Marshall, the Army’s top general, feared that the blockade would extend the war beyond the patience of the American home front; he thought the invasion was the faster way to bring about an American victory.

The United States was holding more than 400,000 prisoners of war: 370,000 Germans, 50,000 Italians, and 5,000 Japanese. German and Italian troops were far more prone to surrender because it was not considered unpatriotic if they did. For the Japanese, however, surrender was simply out of the question. Japanese troops were instructed to fight to the death; if they ran out of ammunition, they were told to charge the enemy or commit suicide. Anything less would bring dishonor to themselves and their surviving family members. The fact that there were so few Japanese prisoners of war reinforced the military’s view that any battle on the Japanese mainland would be arduous and bloody.

Top U.S. military officers had also reviewed the post-action reports of the battles for Iwo Jima and Okinawa, which, combined, cost the United States more than 100,000 casualties. As Skates writes, “Public concern already simmered over the casualties of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. What would the cost of Downfall (the overall name for amphibious assaults against Japan) be and could Americans sustain it? Could any methods be used to minimize the casualties?”

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the Army’s commanding officer in the Pacific, would lead the ground attack on Kyushu while the Navy’s top officer in the Pacific, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, would be responsible for transporting the troops, the amphibious assault itself, and providing all the necessary support for MacArthur’s troops, including food, fuel, ammunition and other supplies.

Operation Olympic, had it occurred, would be one of the largest amphibious assaults in all of military history. It would have entailed 12 divisions “comprising 427,400 troops and 626,800 tons of supplies,” writes Skates. The assault on Normandy, in comparison, looks small: It only involved five divisions for the beach landing and another three airborne divisions that were dropped in the middle of the night, just prior to the amphibious landings.

American military analysts thought that U.S. forces would occupy at least half of Kyushu, if not the entire Island. If Japan’s leaders still refused to surrender, even though U.S. forces were on Kyushu, then MacArthur and Nimitz would initiate Operation Coronet, an amphibious assault on Honshu, Japan’s main island, in March 1946. This operation would have involved “14 divisions with 462,000 troops,” writes Skates.

The best military estimates said that Japan would put up an all-out fight in the defense of Kyushu. They may not have had the best troops to prevent American forces from succeeding but the thinking was that at Kyushu, Japanese soldiers, sailors and airmen would make a gallant, albeit suicidal, stand.

Casualties, Skates says, would have been higher during Operation Olympic than on Operation Coronet. MacArthur’s intelligence officers estimated that “about fourteen thousand soldiers and airmen would die in the first sixty days of Olympic,” writes Skates. MacArthur estimated that there would be nearly 80,000 American casualties – killed and wounded – during the first 60 days of the invasion of Kyushu. If the battle lasted 120 days, MacArthur estimated there would be more than 100,000 American casualties.

The battle losses, Skates writes, were based on the casualties that American forces endured on both Okinawa as well as in Normandy, where the First U.S. Army suffered more than 60,000 casualties of whom 16,000 were killed during the first 48 days in France. “Much evidence exists that casualty estimates for the invasion were realistic and based on past experience,” writes Skates. And while the invasion of Kyushu would cause no more American losses than had been realized in Normandy or on Okinawa, as Skates writes, that “was small comfort” to American civilian and military leaders.

“The earlier fanatical and suicidal, yet hopeless Japanese defenses created a psychology that the normal conventions of war did not apply against a nation of potential kamikazes,” writes Skates.

In addition to facing a suicidal enemy, the United States attempted, throughout the war, to gain the participation of the Soviet Union in its fight against Japan. The Soviets made a number of promises to the United States about its willingness to fight Japan, including invading parts of the Japanese Empire, but they didn’t declare war against Japan until the day after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.

Like all leaders, President Truman and those he consulted for achieving a military and political victory in World War II, couldn’t foresee the future. What they had before them, as they debated the tactics and strategy to be employed in bringing about Japan’s surrender, was the results, including the number of dead and wounded so far, as well as an idea of the level of patience that the American public had for finishing the war.

“The bomb, whether used strategically or tactically, promised to keep U.S. casualties at an acceptable level,” writes Skates. “The bomb also would shock Japanese leaders, and combined with other demonstrations of hopelessness of continued resistance, might tip the balance toward surrender.”

As a result, the President ordered the atomic bombing of Japan. The first one was dropped on August 6, on Hiroshima; the next one was dropped three days later on Nagasaki.

It took two atomic bombs killing about 200,000 people to shock Japan’s emperor into realizing the war was lost. The objective of the war, Japan’s unconditional surrender, had been achieved. More than 100,000 U.S. lives had been spared death and injury.

Overall, this is an excellent book. It’s very well researched and lays out a number of details that the average history reader would likely find tedious. The only flaw in the book is that not enough attention is given to Truman’s perspective. The reader would have been better served had the author given us some details on Truman’s fears and hopes on both the atomic bomb as well as the invasion. Perhaps this information isn’t available.

The lesson here, if there’s any, is that the victory usually comes about when the enemy is “shocked and awed.” The best way to “shock and awe” the enemy, as military historian Michael Doubler points out, is to “let your enemy tell you that you’re shocking and awesome. Don’t tell the enemy you’re going to shock and awe them.”

The idea of shocking an enemy into surrender is nothing new. During the Civil War, Union forces shocked the Confederacy into capitulation through General William Tecumseh Sherman’s march on the South. It showed the South that their position was hopeless. Only the Union could win. During the American Revolution, the Battle of Yorktown, while not exactly a stunning U.S. victory, showed the British that the French were committed to the American cause and that for the British to continue it was to put at risk more than the fight was worth.

Today, the United States faces a suicidal enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan. The difference is that neither enemy fights for a particular government. And the question remains how does the United States force these enemies into realizing their position is hopeless; for that matter can it even be achieved? Do we march an Army or Marine Division or two up into the mountains of Afghanistan, killing everyone we encounter? Or do we shock them into making peace by showing them the benefits of harmony with the United States and the West? How will we shock the Iraqi insurgency into accepting a peaceful settlement with Iraq’s government and, consequently, the countries with troops stationed in Iraq?

Any given day, President Bush might say the following to himself:

• “We’re fighting a suicidal enemy.
• The enemy is militarily beaten but remains belligerent.
• There’s no sign of surrender.
• The enemy appears to be breaking up, with some saying they want peace while others want to fight. The ones wanting peace don’t speak with authority.
• The American populace is war weary.
• Problematic Allies.”

Mark Twain is reported to have said, “History doesn’t repeat itself but it sure does rhyme.” And so it does.

(Writer’s note: The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb, published in 1994, can be found on alibris.com. The writer of this blog makes no money from alibris.com but wishes he did.)

Publishing Information: The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb, by John Ray Skates, University of South Carolina Press, 1994, 276 pages

The Battle of Okinawa & How the War Started

Friday, June 29, 1945
By Combined News Services
GUAM – The Battle of Okinawa, lasting 83 days, was declared completed today as American forces moved into the mop-up stage of the operation, neutralizing pockets of Japanese resistance and taking far more prisoners than had been expected, Navy officials said.

Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, the top U.S. military commander of the operation, reported that the invasion’s success came at a high price: Nearly 12,000 U.S. soldiers, marines and sailors were killed during the battle that also saw the loss of more than 30 American warships, each and every one sunk by Japanese suicide planes, known as kamikazes, and nearly 800 aircraft.

About 65,000 American military personnel were wounded for a total of nearly 80,000 American casualties in the 83-day campaign, making it the bloodiest operation in the island-hopping drive against Japan.

Admiral Nimitz reported that 7,613 Army and Marine troops were killed, 31,807 were wounded and there were another 26,000 casualties, most of them suffering from combat fatigue. The Navy lost 4,320 sailors, with another 7,300 sailors wounded during the battle.

“Our casualties were high but not unexpected,” said Nimitz. “The Japs are a tough enemy, and we knew this would be a very difficult operation. It’s over.”

Included among the dead was the commanding officer of the ground troops, Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., commanding officer of the 10th Army, which included nearly 200,000 combat soldiers.

“General Buckner, I’m sorry to report, was killed at the front, observing the Marines,” said Admiral Nimitz. “A Japanese shell blew up a nearby rock and a fragment from that rock went through the General’s chest.”

Buckner is the highest ranking U.S. officer killed in combat in the Pacific, the Admiral reported.

Okinawa, an island about 60 miles long and 18 miles wide at its widest point, was defended by more than 100,000 Japanese troops. Other than the 10,000 Japanese soldiers that surrendered, the rest were either killed by American forces or by their own hand because they refused to surrender.

The operation also cost the lives of nearly 80,000 of the island’s native, civilian inhabitants. U.S. military personnel are distributing food and medical assistance to the surviving native population.

Okinawa, considered a part of Tokyo by the Japanese, is a highly valuable prize in the war because it’s 350 miles from Japan’s Kyushu island and less than 1,000 miles from Tokyo, putting these two targets within easy range of U.S. bombers soon be based on the island. Because of its size, Okinawa is considered, highly placed military sources say, an excellent staging point for an invasion of Japan.

One of the biggest problems that the Navy faced with Okinawa is that there was very little known about the island. Few Americans had visited it since Commodore Matthew Perry stopped by on his way to Japan in 1853.

Navy intelligence did track down an American citizen who had visited the island, and he provided valuable information. But the number and type of Japan’s forces on the island was a guess, Nimitz said, and that’s the reason so many American troops were used in the attack.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, commanding U.S. and Allied forces in the south Pacific, has been critical of the Okinawa operation, saying there was no reason to wipe out the entire Japanese force at such a cost to American life.

“They could have cordoned off the remaining Japanese troops and starved them,” the General said from his headquarters in Manila. Most of the Japanese troops had been bottled up in the southern part of the island, MacArthur said.

Prior to the attack, military sources said, it was thought that Japanese defenders would be entrenched throughout the island. They would be so well hidden, they said, that it would be difficult for American ground troops to overwhelm the enemy.

As a result, a new weapon was introduced during the Okinawa invasion – the flame-throwing tank, Admiral Nimitz said. It was used to kill Japanese troops hidden in caves throughout the island.

As the operation on Okinawa comes to an end, U.S. and Allied military planners are figuring out the next stage of the war against the sole remaining Axis Power, Japan.

“Japan will feel the full force and weight of the United States,” said General of the Army George Marshall, the Army’s commanding general. Marshall would not comment on MacArthur’s disagreement with the Navy over tactics used on Okinawa.

The Pentagon today said that nearly 400,000 Americans had been killed during the war and that nearly 600,000 more had been wounded.

“We’ve averaged about 5,000 killed and wounded every week since we entered the war,” said a Pentagon spokesman, Lt. Cdr. Elliot Jones.

Back in Washington, a document has surfaced that shows that Roosevelt administration may have actually provoked Japan into a war. Congressional sources say they’re releasing parts of the document now because President Roosevelt is dead.

Written by a Navy officer just prior to the 1940 presidential election, the document laid out eight proposals, that if taken by the United States, would likely provoke Japan into taking hostile action against the United States.

The proposals included arranging for the United States to have access to British bases in Singapore; assisting the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek in its attempt to defeat the Japanese invasion of China; placing the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii; insisting that the Dutch refuse to provide oil to Japan from their holdings in the West Indies; and embargoing all trade with Japan.

“All of these actions were taken by the Roosevelt administration,” said U.S. Sen. Alben Barkley, (D-KY), whose office released the document.

“It shows that the Roosevelt Administration deliberately pushed us into a war with Japan,” said U.S. Sen. Arthur Vandenburg, (R-MI). “Japan had no choice but to attack us.”

“This may hinder the Truman administration as it finds a way to end the war with Japan,” said Senator Barkley.

The Truman administration would not comment on the memo but said it was determined to find a way to accomplish both a political and military victory over Japan.

On The Other Hand: What Could Have Been

Sunday, December 27, 1942
By Combined Wire Services
WASHINGTON – While U.S. casualties continue to increase across the Pacific, and with a ground offensive recently initiated against Nazi-held North Africa, the president’s war plan to halt Germany's and Japan’s ambitions is under scrutiny by a skeptical Congress, with some members saying that President Roosevelt deliberately provoked a needless war against the two countries.

Nearly 13 months after the most damaging military attack on U.S. soil, the strike against Pearl Harbor, on the Hawaiian Island of Oahu, is now under Congressional investigation. In some quarters of Congress, there are concerns that the President may have either previously known about Japan’s plans to attack the U.S. base – or deliberately and clandestinely provoked a war with Japan, which forced Germany to declare war against the United States.

Worse, Roosevelt’s critics say, once he knew of Japan’s plans to strike Pearl Harbor, he refused to alert his military commanders, so U.S. forces in the Pacific would be caught by surprise. This would then gain U.S. public support for America’s entry into World War II, the president’s Congressional critics say.

Prior to the attack, the Gallup opinion poll said there was little domestic support for fighting either Japan or Germany. After Pearl Harbor, public opinion shifted drastically in favor of fighting both countries.

“If you look at FDR’s actions between 1940 and 1941,” said U.S. Rep. Martin Sweeney (D-OH), “he was trying to find a way to have Japan and Germany fight the United States.”

Shortly after the attack, Congress formed a joint Senate and House committee to investigate its causes as well as the administration’s policies toward Japan prior to the attack.

“We’ve come across a very interesting memo,” said U.S. Sen. Alben Barkley, (D-KY), who chairs the committee investigating the surprise attack. “It appears to confirm some concerns that the administration may have been overly aggressive in its approach to Japan” before it attacked Pearl Harbor.

The Senator would give few details about the note but described it as “written by a naval officer who appears to have great knowledge of the Japanese.”

The War Department would neither confirm nor deny the memo’s existence.

Congressional support for the Roosevelt Administration’s war policies is weakening, critics say, because of heavy U.S. military losses.

The Army and the Marines, battling Japanese troops on the Pacific Islands of New Guinea and Guadalcanal, have suffered thousands of casualties. In addition, the Navy has lost a number of ships, including five aircraft carriers, to the Japanese, this year.

Congressional critics say the United States, unprepared for war against Japan, was forced to surrender some of its most strategic Pacific possessions, including Wake and Guam Islands as well as the Philippines.

“Had our military commanders been better led by the President,” said U.S. Sen. Homer Ferguson, (R-MI), “there’s a good chance we would not have been forced to give up our strategic outposts in the Pacific.”

The loss of the Philippines was particularly devastating because 76,000 U.S. troops, the largest U.S. military force to ever capitulate in the country’s history, surrendered to the Japanese. Coincidentally, the troops surrendered on the 77th anniversary of the day that Confederate General Robert E. Lee ordered his army to lay down its arms to forces led by Union General Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox, Virginia, which ended the Civil War.

While the Navy stopped the Japanese at the Battle of the Coral Sea in May and again, in June, at the Battle of Midway, an archipelago just north of Hawaii, the losses for these two victories were costly, including hundreds of planes and two aircraft carriers. The other three U.S. aircraft carriers were lost during other Pacific battles against the Japanese.

Japan’s losses at the Battle of Midway, Navy intelligence says, were even higher, including four aircraft carriers, two cruisers, three destroyers and some small boats. Japan's losses have not been confirmed by Tokyo.

Another military success against Japan, although limited in its effect, included the bombing of Japan. Many of the operation’s details remain secret.

On the ground, however, the fighting situation is quite different. U.S. soldiers and Marines find themselves bogged down battling an entrenched enemy. U.S. losses on New Guinea and Guadalcanal are heavy – into the thousands – because Japanese troops, military commanders say, often fight to the death rather than surrender.

“I’m afraid a lot of people think the Jap is a ‘pushover,’” said Army Air Force Lt. Gen. George Kenney, who heads up the Allied Air Forces in the southwest Pacific. “We will have to call on all our patriotism, stamina, guts, and maybe some crusading spirit or religious fervor thrown in, to beat him.

“No amateur team will take this boy out. You take on Notre Dame, every time you play,” the general said.

Shortly after the mid-term elections, the Army landed troops in Algeria and Morocco to liberate North Africa from German occupation. The operation, under the command of Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, if it is successful, will allow the Allies to move more freely around the Mediterranean Sea.

Prior to Germany’s declaration of war against the United States, diplomatic relations between the two countries had reached a stand-off, with the United States closing 24 German consulates across the country, saying they were havens for Nazi spies.

In addition, the United States loaned Great Britain 50 destroyers in exchange for 99-year leases on certain British Naval Bases, including those in Newfoundland, Bermuda and the West Indies.

“The destroyer trade was an ‘out-right declaration of war’,” said U.S. Sen. Gerald Nye, (R-ND). “It was a belligerent act that weakened our defenses.”

Seven months prior to the outbreak of war with Germany, the Navy started engaging the Third Reich’s submarines while escorting merchant ships sailing between the United States and Great Britain.

The United States even started supplying Great Britain with materiel it needed to survive Germany’s onslaught. The President defended U.S actions by saying, “If your neighbor’s house is on fire, you lend him your garden hose so your house is safe.”

“We were fighting Germany before the war even happened,” said Senator Ferguson. “It’s becoming quite clear that the President acted without Congressional authority to do that.”

(Writer’s note: This account is entirely fictional. Some of the information is accurate. This article is intended to be thought-provoking. Is it possible for anyone to understand the action’s any country takes during wartime? Are there any similarities between President Roosevelt’s actions, in his attempt to defeat fascism, and those of President George W. Bush, in his attempt to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq? Could World War II have ended differently?)

Hold the applause on North Korea

While President Bush and his administration are giving themselves high fives for their diplomatic victory against North Korea at the United Nations, let’s keep in mind what the sanctions didn’t address on Saturday – the demise of North Korea, which means, for the foreseeable future, Kim Jung Il will continue to menace the world in general and the United States in particular.

China, North Korea’s best ally, sharing a border with the rogue state that’s about 880 miles long, has every reason to support Kim Jung Il. While Beijing may have lost some respect for not being able to control their stooge in Pyongyang, their interest in mining North Korea for gold and other precious metals supersedes anything they lost last week.

The Chinese have their eyes on the country’s natural resources and are prepared to pay North Korea for the rights to mine them. China will sell these precious metals. North Korea, for that matter, needs assistance bringing these natural resources to market; in addition, Kim Jung Il knows that whatever payment he receives from the Chinese will prop up his regime.

China will talk a good game about enforcing the U.N.-approved sanctions against North Korea, but don’t expect them to lead the charge, let alone do much. In addition, China views North Korea as part of their area of influence. As The Economist reports, Beijing considers a unified Korean peninsula a potential threat to national security. They prefer a divided peninsula because it maintains their influence with Japan.

To be sure, some damage has been inflicted on North Korea. Kim Jung Il’s favorite bank, Macao-based Banco Delta Asia, has been pressured by the United States to shut down or freeze the accounts of the North Korean leadership. This certainly crimps Kim Jung Il’s style but not so much that he feels his days are coming to an end.

So, essentially, very little progress has been made against North Korea. The only thing that’s likely to bring the regime to an end is either a U.S.-led war or a charge led by renegades inside North Korea. Neither is on the horizon.