People, Putin and Vladimir's Great Terror

If anything is surprising about Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine, it’s that the plan was practically written by a retired British Army general. Sir John Hackett, in his novel, The Third World War: August 1985, published more than 40 years ago, along with his co-authors, described how the Soviet Union invaded western Europe, used a nuclear missile, and, after Great Britain and the United States responded in kind, experienced a coup. Coincidentally enough, in the novel, it’s a Ukrainian, Vasyl Duglenko, who becomes the Soviet Union’s new leader and sues for peace, bringing down the federation and leaving Russia isolated and alone.

The only question today is how Putin’s "special military operation" ends. Will he turn to nuclear weapons, as described in Sir John’s book, or will he continue to fight a conventional war, possibly expanding it against NATO? Will another revolution break out in Russia, similar to what happened during the First World War? And will Putin’s allies, whether it’s China or a former Soviet republic, join him on his military adventure or decline the opportunity? 

The only thing that’s certain, as of right now, is that the West is responding to Russia’s aggression and Putin’s war aims haven’t been met, at least not yet. Given that NATO appears to have found its backbone, it doesn’t appear Russia will be successful.

 

The best way to end this – to show the average Russian, and those in the government, that Putin’s military adventurism was ill-conceived and without any payoff – is for Ukraine to inflict the highest number of casualties possible against Russian armed forces and to liberate the territory that Moscow seized in 2014. Anything less could provide the average Russian, as well as someone in Putin’s government, with a lingering sense that their invasion is or was winnable. 

 

As for Putin’s latest speech, if he wants to return the country to its “glory days” of the 19^th century, so be it. By isolating his country from the West, which has a higher standard of living than Russia, Putin is leading it onto a suicidal path, economically and militarily. In addition, he is, without question, worried about his citizens because he’s censoring and silencing them. Most certainly, he’s making sure Moscow has one reliable ally, China, which could very well be encouraging this fool’s errand so it can gain insight into the U.S. and allied response should it attack Taiwan.

 

Then there’s the issue of Moscow suspending The New START Treaty. Could this lead Putin to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine or a NATO country? It’s hard to fathom he isn’t aware of how NATO would respond. But given the underestimation of NATO’s response to his conventional attack, a nuclear exchange isn’t out of the question.

 

If Russia’s military operation continues without success, say for another year or two, which appears possible, Putin could likely become even more apprehensive, not so much about how he’s perceived by other countries but by his own people, perhaps even those closest to him. Will it lead him to enact a modern-day version of Joseph Stalin’s Great Terror?

 

Russia has a history of revolution. It’s not limited to just 1917. Its people turned against their leaders recently, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, taking down the Soviet Union. At some point, after experiencing the despondency of a soured economy and anguish and torment from burying their sons, brothers, cousins, fathers, and uncles from a failed military operation, they’ll likely do what Sir John and his co-authors wrote: They’ll revolt.

 

How bloody could this next revolution be? Could it be successful and who will be in charge next – one of Putin’s former cronies or a surprise, someone no one saw on the horizon?

 

Putin would be well-advised to declare victory and leave Ukraine.

 

 

 

 

The Rhymes of History

Sitting down in his study, the President of the United States reviews the war briefing he’s just received from his top military, political and foreign policy advisors and writes a few notes:

“This is what I know:

• We’re fighting a suicidal enemy.
• The enemy is militarily beaten but belligerent.
• There’s no sign of surrender.
• The enemy appears to be breaking up, with some saying they want peace while others want to fight. The ones wanting peace don’t speak with authority.
• The American populace is war weary.
• Problematic Allies.”

Sound like George W. Bush dealing with the war in Iraq?

Try Harry S. Truman, around June or July 1945, figuring out how to end the war with Japan so World War II could come to a conclusion.

President Truman likely never wrote those words, or anything similar, after talking with his advisors about the way to end the war with Japan, but he probably had thoughts along those lines. In the summer of 1945, as U.S. troops were occupying Germany, and the fighting on Okinawa against Japanese forces was ending, Truman was feeling pressure to end the war, on U.S. terms, as fast as possible.

Prior to Truman becoming president, senior U.S. military officers were focusing on the best way to bring the war with Japan to an end. Invasion plans were prepared for the Japanese islands and commanders and military units, as well as personnel, were selected for the pending assault, which was scheduled for November 1945. The goal was for Japan to surrender unconditionally, just like Germany did, 12 months after the Nazis gave up.

While plans were being finalized, top U.S. military officers, including the president, learned that a new weapon, the atomic bomb, would be at their disposal sometime that summer. There were a number of questions and issues about the bomb. Would it work? Was it a strategic or tactical weapon? Would it shock the enemy into surrender? Or would Japanese leaders react to it the way they did the night U.S. planes fire-bombed Tokyo, killing nearly 85,000 people? They didn’t.

These questions, the positions of top U.S. leaders, the debates between them, potential casualties resulting from the assault on Japan, as well as the complex issues the United States faced abroad and at home, are discussed with great authority by John Ray Skates, a history professor at the University of Southern Mississippi, in his book The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb.

The book is especially pertinent today as the United States debates the best way to end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while extracting some sort of political-military victory from the effort that’s been expended. It forces the reader to think about how the United States can shock its enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan into ending the fight; the book also makes the reader consider that perhaps there is no possible way to stun Al Qaida and Iraqi insurgents into submission. Skates, a retired army colonel, lays out, in excruciating detail, the debates, positions and discussions had by America’s leaders on the quickest and best possible way to coerce Japan into accepting the Allied policy of unconditional surrender.

In mid-1945, Japan still had five million men under arms. They’d lost every battle they’d fought against the United States since June 1942; however, Japan’s leaders didn’t see themselves as defeated. They knew U.S. troops would likely land on Kyushu, the Japanese island that American troops would invade in Operation Olympic, and they were preparing an intricate defense. While they couldn’t stop the invasion, Japan’s top brass thought, instead, that they could bleed the United States into accepting a negotiated settlement that was far short of its clearly stated, very public, and Allied-approved objective of unconditional surrender.

Skates shows how the policy of unconditional surrender for both Germany and Japan, as pushed through by President Roosevelt in early 1943, as well as the level of casualties the United States had sustained, determined military actions and, eventually, the use of the atomic bomb. The policy, as well as the experience from fighting Japan, forced America’s top leaders into coming up with the most efficient way into forcing Japan’s surrender.

By the time the summer of 1945 rolled around, the United States had suffered nearly 400,000 combat deaths with another 600,000 troops wounded. Top military commanders worried about the additional casualties the United States would suffer should it invade Kyushu. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, the Navy’s top officer, thought Japan could be brought down through a blockade that would essentially starve Japan’s populace – at minimal cost of U.S. lives; others, like General of the Army George C. Marshall, the Army’s top general, feared that the blockade would extend the war beyond the patience of the American home front; he thought the invasion was the faster way to bring about an American victory.

The United States was holding more than 400,000 prisoners of war: 370,000 Germans, 50,000 Italians, and 5,000 Japanese. German and Italian troops were far more prone to surrender because it was not considered unpatriotic if they did. For the Japanese, however, surrender was simply out of the question. Japanese troops were instructed to fight to the death; if they ran out of ammunition, they were told to charge the enemy or commit suicide. Anything less would bring dishonor to themselves and their surviving family members. The fact that there were so few Japanese prisoners of war reinforced the military’s view that any battle on the Japanese mainland would be arduous and bloody.

Top U.S. military officers had also reviewed the post-action reports of the battles for Iwo Jima and Okinawa, which, combined, cost the United States more than 100,000 casualties. As Skates writes, “Public concern already simmered over the casualties of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. What would the cost of Downfall (the overall name for amphibious assaults against Japan) be and could Americans sustain it? Could any methods be used to minimize the casualties?”

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the Army’s commanding officer in the Pacific, would lead the ground attack on Kyushu while the Navy’s top officer in the Pacific, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, would be responsible for transporting the troops, the amphibious assault itself, and providing all the necessary support for MacArthur’s troops, including food, fuel, ammunition and other supplies.

Operation Olympic, had it occurred, would be one of the largest amphibious assaults in all of military history. It would have entailed 12 divisions “comprising 427,400 troops and 626,800 tons of supplies,” writes Skates. The assault on Normandy, in comparison, looks small: It only involved five divisions for the beach landing and another three airborne divisions that were dropped in the middle of the night, just prior to the amphibious landings.

American military analysts thought that U.S. forces would occupy at least half of Kyushu, if not the entire Island. If Japan’s leaders still refused to surrender, even though U.S. forces were on Kyushu, then MacArthur and Nimitz would initiate Operation Coronet, an amphibious assault on Honshu, Japan’s main island, in March 1946. This operation would have involved “14 divisions with 462,000 troops,” writes Skates.

The best military estimates said that Japan would put up an all-out fight in the defense of Kyushu. They may not have had the best troops to prevent American forces from succeeding but the thinking was that at Kyushu, Japanese soldiers, sailors and airmen would make a gallant, albeit suicidal, stand.

Casualties, Skates says, would have been higher during Operation Olympic than on Operation Coronet. MacArthur’s intelligence officers estimated that “about fourteen thousand soldiers and airmen would die in the first sixty days of Olympic,” writes Skates. MacArthur estimated that there would be nearly 80,000 American casualties – killed and wounded – during the first 60 days of the invasion of Kyushu. If the battle lasted 120 days, MacArthur estimated there would be more than 100,000 American casualties.

The battle losses, Skates writes, were based on the casualties that American forces endured on both Okinawa as well as in Normandy, where the First U.S. Army suffered more than 60,000 casualties of whom 16,000 were killed during the first 48 days in France. “Much evidence exists that casualty estimates for the invasion were realistic and based on past experience,” writes Skates. And while the invasion of Kyushu would cause no more American losses than had been realized in Normandy or on Okinawa, as Skates writes, that “was small comfort” to American civilian and military leaders.

“The earlier fanatical and suicidal, yet hopeless Japanese defenses created a psychology that the normal conventions of war did not apply against a nation of potential kamikazes,” writes Skates.

In addition to facing a suicidal enemy, the United States attempted, throughout the war, to gain the participation of the Soviet Union in its fight against Japan. The Soviets made a number of promises to the United States about its willingness to fight Japan, including invading parts of the Japanese Empire, but they didn’t declare war against Japan until the day after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.

Like all leaders, President Truman and those he consulted for achieving a military and political victory in World War II, couldn’t foresee the future. What they had before them, as they debated the tactics and strategy to be employed in bringing about Japan’s surrender, was the results, including the number of dead and wounded so far, as well as an idea of the level of patience that the American public had for finishing the war.

“The bomb, whether used strategically or tactically, promised to keep U.S. casualties at an acceptable level,” writes Skates. “The bomb also would shock Japanese leaders, and combined with other demonstrations of hopelessness of continued resistance, might tip the balance toward surrender.”

As a result, the President ordered the atomic bombing of Japan. The first one was dropped on August 6, on Hiroshima; the next one was dropped three days later on Nagasaki.

It took two atomic bombs killing about 200,000 people to shock Japan’s emperor into realizing the war was lost. The objective of the war, Japan’s unconditional surrender, had been achieved. More than 100,000 U.S. lives had been spared death and injury.

Overall, this is an excellent book. It’s very well researched and lays out a number of details that the average history reader would likely find tedious. The only flaw in the book is that not enough attention is given to Truman’s perspective. The reader would have been better served had the author given us some details on Truman’s fears and hopes on both the atomic bomb as well as the invasion. Perhaps this information isn’t available.

The lesson here, if there’s any, is that the victory usually comes about when the enemy is “shocked and awed.” The best way to “shock and awe” the enemy, as military historian Michael Doubler points out, is to “let your enemy tell you that you’re shocking and awesome. Don’t tell the enemy you’re going to shock and awe them.”

The idea of shocking an enemy into surrender is nothing new. During the Civil War, Union forces shocked the Confederacy into capitulation through General William Tecumseh Sherman’s march on the South. It showed the South that their position was hopeless. Only the Union could win. During the American Revolution, the Battle of Yorktown, while not exactly a stunning U.S. victory, showed the British that the French were committed to the American cause and that for the British to continue it was to put at risk more than the fight was worth.

Today, the United States faces a suicidal enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan. The difference is that neither enemy fights for a particular government. And the question remains how does the United States force these enemies into realizing their position is hopeless; for that matter can it even be achieved? Do we march an Army or Marine Division or two up into the mountains of Afghanistan, killing everyone we encounter? Or do we shock them into making peace by showing them the benefits of harmony with the United States and the West? How will we shock the Iraqi insurgency into accepting a peaceful settlement with Iraq’s government and, consequently, the countries with troops stationed in Iraq?

Any given day, President Bush might say the following to himself:

• “We’re fighting a suicidal enemy.
• The enemy is militarily beaten but remains belligerent.
• There’s no sign of surrender.
• The enemy appears to be breaking up, with some saying they want peace while others want to fight. The ones wanting peace don’t speak with authority.
• The American populace is war weary.
• Problematic Allies.”

Mark Twain is reported to have said, “History doesn’t repeat itself but it sure does rhyme.” And so it does.

(Writer’s note: The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb, published in 1994, can be found on alibris.com. The writer of this blog makes no money from alibris.com but wishes he did.)

Publishing Information: The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb, by John Ray Skates, University of South Carolina Press, 1994, 276 pages

On The Other Hand: What Could Have Been

Sunday, December 27, 1942
By Combined Wire Services
WASHINGTON – While U.S. casualties continue to increase across the Pacific, and with a ground offensive recently initiated against Nazi-held North Africa, the president’s war plan to halt Germany's and Japan’s ambitions is under scrutiny by a skeptical Congress, with some members saying that President Roosevelt deliberately provoked a needless war against the two countries.

Nearly 13 months after the most damaging military attack on U.S. soil, the strike against Pearl Harbor, on the Hawaiian Island of Oahu, is now under Congressional investigation. In some quarters of Congress, there are concerns that the President may have either previously known about Japan’s plans to attack the U.S. base – or deliberately and clandestinely provoked a war with Japan, which forced Germany to declare war against the United States.

Worse, Roosevelt’s critics say, once he knew of Japan’s plans to strike Pearl Harbor, he refused to alert his military commanders, so U.S. forces in the Pacific would be caught by surprise. This would then gain U.S. public support for America’s entry into World War II, the president’s Congressional critics say.

Prior to the attack, the Gallup opinion poll said there was little domestic support for fighting either Japan or Germany. After Pearl Harbor, public opinion shifted drastically in favor of fighting both countries.

“If you look at FDR’s actions between 1940 and 1941,” said U.S. Rep. Martin Sweeney (D-OH), “he was trying to find a way to have Japan and Germany fight the United States.”

Shortly after the attack, Congress formed a joint Senate and House committee to investigate its causes as well as the administration’s policies toward Japan prior to the attack.

“We’ve come across a very interesting memo,” said U.S. Sen. Alben Barkley, (D-KY), who chairs the committee investigating the surprise attack. “It appears to confirm some concerns that the administration may have been overly aggressive in its approach to Japan” before it attacked Pearl Harbor.

The Senator would give few details about the note but described it as “written by a naval officer who appears to have great knowledge of the Japanese.”

The War Department would neither confirm nor deny the memo’s existence.

Congressional support for the Roosevelt Administration’s war policies is weakening, critics say, because of heavy U.S. military losses.

The Army and the Marines, battling Japanese troops on the Pacific Islands of New Guinea and Guadalcanal, have suffered thousands of casualties. In addition, the Navy has lost a number of ships, including five aircraft carriers, to the Japanese, this year.

Congressional critics say the United States, unprepared for war against Japan, was forced to surrender some of its most strategic Pacific possessions, including Wake and Guam Islands as well as the Philippines.

“Had our military commanders been better led by the President,” said U.S. Sen. Homer Ferguson, (R-MI), “there’s a good chance we would not have been forced to give up our strategic outposts in the Pacific.”

The loss of the Philippines was particularly devastating because 76,000 U.S. troops, the largest U.S. military force to ever capitulate in the country’s history, surrendered to the Japanese. Coincidentally, the troops surrendered on the 77th anniversary of the day that Confederate General Robert E. Lee ordered his army to lay down its arms to forces led by Union General Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox, Virginia, which ended the Civil War.

While the Navy stopped the Japanese at the Battle of the Coral Sea in May and again, in June, at the Battle of Midway, an archipelago just north of Hawaii, the losses for these two victories were costly, including hundreds of planes and two aircraft carriers. The other three U.S. aircraft carriers were lost during other Pacific battles against the Japanese.

Japan’s losses at the Battle of Midway, Navy intelligence says, were even higher, including four aircraft carriers, two cruisers, three destroyers and some small boats. Japan's losses have not been confirmed by Tokyo.

Another military success against Japan, although limited in its effect, included the bombing of Japan. Many of the operation’s details remain secret.

On the ground, however, the fighting situation is quite different. U.S. soldiers and Marines find themselves bogged down battling an entrenched enemy. U.S. losses on New Guinea and Guadalcanal are heavy – into the thousands – because Japanese troops, military commanders say, often fight to the death rather than surrender.

“I’m afraid a lot of people think the Jap is a ‘pushover,’” said Army Air Force Lt. Gen. George Kenney, who heads up the Allied Air Forces in the southwest Pacific. “We will have to call on all our patriotism, stamina, guts, and maybe some crusading spirit or religious fervor thrown in, to beat him.

“No amateur team will take this boy out. You take on Notre Dame, every time you play,” the general said.

Shortly after the mid-term elections, the Army landed troops in Algeria and Morocco to liberate North Africa from German occupation. The operation, under the command of Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, if it is successful, will allow the Allies to move more freely around the Mediterranean Sea.

Prior to Germany’s declaration of war against the United States, diplomatic relations between the two countries had reached a stand-off, with the United States closing 24 German consulates across the country, saying they were havens for Nazi spies.

In addition, the United States loaned Great Britain 50 destroyers in exchange for 99-year leases on certain British Naval Bases, including those in Newfoundland, Bermuda and the West Indies.

“The destroyer trade was an ‘out-right declaration of war’,” said U.S. Sen. Gerald Nye, (R-ND). “It was a belligerent act that weakened our defenses.”

Seven months prior to the outbreak of war with Germany, the Navy started engaging the Third Reich’s submarines while escorting merchant ships sailing between the United States and Great Britain.

The United States even started supplying Great Britain with materiel it needed to survive Germany’s onslaught. The President defended U.S actions by saying, “If your neighbor’s house is on fire, you lend him your garden hose so your house is safe.”

“We were fighting Germany before the war even happened,” said Senator Ferguson. “It’s becoming quite clear that the President acted without Congressional authority to do that.”

(Writer’s note: This account is entirely fictional. Some of the information is accurate. This article is intended to be thought-provoking. Is it possible for anyone to understand the action’s any country takes during wartime? Are there any similarities between President Roosevelt’s actions, in his attempt to defeat fascism, and those of President George W. Bush, in his attempt to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq? Could World War II have ended differently?)

Inspired to attack

Let's keep something in mind: The appeasement policies of Neville Chamberlain inspired Adolf Hitler. Chamberlain tried hard to keep Hitler in a bottle and even gave away Austria, thinking it would satisfy him.

As we all know, it didn't. Hitler attacked Poland and then followed up that campaign with one against Western Europe.

So, if anyone tells you that the war in Iraq is only inspiring the terrorists and making the United States more vulnerable to attack, ask them this: What did the United States do, before 9/11, to inspire the terrorists?

If anything, we've done more for Muslims than they've ever done for Christians or, for that matter, Jews. At the direction of President Bill Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the United States, and its NATO allies, defended Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo with bombing campaigns over Serbia and other parts of the Balkans.

And, I note, there were no Saudi fighter jets, or any other planes from Muslim and Arab countries, flying sorties against the Serbians. If they hate us, fine. But, at the very least, Arabs and Muslims could do a better job of defending their own kind.

In addition, the United States has provided millions of dollars in aid to the Palestinians.

Sometimes a country can do nothing, like Great Britain, and yet still be hated by another country, like Germany of the 1930s, or a terrorist group.